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Despite South Africa’s transition from apartheid in 1994, the social landscape is 
still fragmented along racial lines. However, South Africa has an impressive social 
grants system by international  standards, with social assistance spending as a 
percentage of GDP comparing to Western European countries during the 1980s 
(the  height  of  the  welfare  state).  This  paper  investigates  the  impact  of  social 
grants poverty and inequality in South African. Using the Income and Expenditure 
Survey of 2005 (IES2005) the normalized Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) measure 
and the General Entropy (GE) measure (to assess the impact of social grants on 
poverty  and  inequality,  respectively),  it  is  found  that  social  grants  have  a 
considerable  impact  on  poverty, and  that  this  impact increases  as  the  poverty 
measure being used becomes more sensitive to the severity of poverty. In terms 
of inequality, it is found that social grants have a negligible impact. The reason 
for  this  is  that  inequality  is  largely  driven  by  the  upper  end  of  the  income 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1994 saw the end of Apartheid in South Africa. Despite the political and constitutional changes 
characterizing South Africa’s transition from apartheid, the distribution of income and poverty within 
society  remained  largely  similar  to  that  which  prevailed  during  the  era  of  discrimination  under 
apartheid. The political transition from Apartheid to an era underpinned by the ideology of equal 
rights was not mirrored in the economic well-being of the citizens of South Africa: inequality in 
poverty levels still characterize the economic landscape.  
 
South Africa’s social security system has its origins in the apartheid era with efforts being made to 
create a welfare state for white South Africans. Although the first pension fund was established as 
early as 1882 by the Transvaal Republic, this pension fund was not prescribed by legislation and as 
such did not constitute social insurance. The Pension Funds Act of 1956 played a substantial role in 
the  regulation  of  the  financial  responsibilities  of  pension  funds,  although  less  skilled  workers 
continued  to  be  excluded  from  pension  coverage.  In  the  context  of  apartheid,  this  implies  the 
exclusion of African workers. It was only in the 1960s and 1970s that rapid industrialization saw a 
large number of African workers being drawn into industry, resulting in an expansion of occupational 
retirement funds to some African workers. Indeed, the total membership of private and occupational 
retirement funds increased from 923 000 to 9 309 000 between 1958 and 1993 (although this figure 
does reflect a substantial amount of duplication, with a large number of South Africans belonging to 
more than one fund) (Smith Committee, 1995). However, despite this rapid extension in coverage, 
the majority of the African labour force remained outside the formal sector and therefore outside 
the coverage of the social insurance net, either because they were unemployed or because they 
were employed in industries in which social retirement insurance was not available (Van der Berg, 
Lekezwa and Siebrits, 2008).  
 
Although various racially differentiated social assistance grants were introduced by the South African 
government in the early 1900s (namely military pensions (1919), social pensions (1928), pensions for 
war veterans (1941), family allowances for large, poor families (1947)), it was only in the 1980s as 
part of the apartheid government’s attempt to legitimize the tricameral parliament and homeland 
system that the full commitment to the elimination of racial differences in all social programmes in 
the social security system began. Fiscal constraints faced by the government at the time necessitated 
a simultaneous decrease in the benefits received by white South Africans and increase in the benefits 
received  by  African  South  Africans,  and  this  was  most  effectively  achieved  in  areas  in  which 
resistance  to  such  a  reduction  in  benefits  would  be  smallest  i.e.  amongst  politically  weak  and 
marginal white groups. For example, the benefit received by poor elderly white people receiving the 
means-tested social old-age pension was reduced and by 1993, the pension gap had been eliminated 
(Van der Berg, Lekezwa and Siebrits, 2008).  
 
The late 1980s onwards was therefore characterized by substantial increases in government social 
assistance spending. The combination of equalization of benefits, the rapid increase in the up-take of 
foster-care and disability grants and the introduction of the child support grant in 1998 were the 
main  drivers  of  the  sizeable  increase.  Indeed,  the  apartheid-era  origins  of  South  Africa’s  social 
security  system  resulted  in  the  extension  of  a  system  that  was  created  with  the  objective  of 
protecting a small section of society resulting in a social assistance system that may be considered 
unusually comprehensive by middle-income developing country standards (Van der Berg, Lekezwa 




South Africa can be said to have a well-developed social security system, largely on par with the 
social  security  systems  of  developed  countries  and  unlike  those  in  place  in  other  developing 
countries (Booysen, 2004: 46). The expansion of the social grants by R22 billion between 2005 and 
2007 translates into grant expansions in excess of R1000 per person. Given that poverty may be 
defined  as  people  surviving  on  incomes  less  than R3000  per  person  per  year,  this  expansion  is 
considerable (Van der Berg, Louw and Yu, 2007). Indeed, the income of South Africa’s poor was 
collectively R27 billion, and so an increase in social grants of R22 billion, if well-targeted, would 
impact substantially on poverty in South Africa. Indeed, even if social grants were not well-targeted, 
an increase of this magnitude may be expected to contribute considerably to poverty alleviation (Van 
der Berg, Louw and Yu, 2007). 
 
Government spending on social grants in South Africa is well-targeted. Woolard (2003) explains that 
in 2000, 66.8% of the total income of the poorest 20% of the South African population was social 
grants, while less than 1% of the income of the richest 20% of the population was grant income.  Van 
der Berg, Lekezwa and Siebrits (2008) report that 76% of government spending on social grants is 
received by the poorest 40% of the population (some 50% of the population as a whole), and that 
grants increase the share of total income of these households from 4.7% to 7.8% of total income.  
 
The coverage of social grants has also increased remarkably in recent years, with the number of 
recipients increasing from 2.4 million in April 1998 to approximately 12.4 million in 2008. It appears 
that increased coverage of the child support grant has driven this increase, with a projected 66.6% of 
all grants paid in April 2008 being child support grants. Other grants with high coverage are social 
old-age pensions (17.9%) and the disability grants (11.3%). However, although the child support 
grant has the widest reach, it is not the largest grant available. Table 1 presents the values of social 
grants in 2008. 
 
 
TABLE 1: MONTHLY VALUES OF SOCIAL GRANTS (AS OF SEPTEMBER 2008) 
 
Old-Age Pension  R960 
War Veterans Grant  R960 
Disability Grant  R940 
Care Dependency Grant  R940 
Foster-Care Grant  R650 
Grant-In-Aid  R210 
Child Support Grant  R210* 
Source: Lekezwa and Siebrits, 2008 
*Increased  to R220 in October 2008 
 
 
 The level of social assistance spending in South Africa at present is extremely high. In 2006, social 
assistance spending in South Africa amounted to 3.5% of GDP – an extremely large proportion, even 
when compared to that of Western European countries in the 1980s. Indeed, as figure 1 below 
illustrates, it is only Denmark in which social spending as a proportion of GDP exceeds that of South 
Africa (Van der Berg, Lekezwa and Siebrits, 2008). Important to remember is that the 1980s was the 
“height  of  the  welfare  state”  in  Western  Europe,  and  so  the  fact  the  level  of  social  assistance  
3 
 
spending was higher than that of 1980s Western Europe illustrates the extent of social assistance 
spending in South Africa in recent years.  
 
FIGURE 1: Social Assistance Spending as % of GDP (Western Europe 1980; South Africa 2006) 
 
 
Source:  Van der Berg, Lekezwa and Siebrits, 2008: 7 
 
It  is  therefore  clear  that  social  grants  in  South  Africa  are  sizeable  and  indeed  impressive  in 
comparison to both developed and developing countries. In addition to the impressive coverage of 
South Africa’s social assistance system, the impact of social grants on household formation implies 
that the impact of social grants extends further than simply to those who qualify to receive them. 
Indeed, the phenomenon of people moving into households in which grants are received (particularly 
in the case of social old age pensions) has for example resulted in the increased effectiveness of 
grants  in  alleviating  poverty  for  a  greater  network  of  people  (Klasen  and  Woolard,  2002). 
Furthermore, this formation of households around social grant income has kept old people in the 
community,  empowered  them  and  contributed  to  the  reduction  in  their  dependence  on  their 
children (Van der Berg, Lekezwa and Siebrits, 2008). Social grants in South Africa are therefore an 




A study focusing on African rural households in the former homelands of South Africa, conducted by 
Leibbrandt, Woolard and Woolard (1996) investigated the relative importance of various income 
sources in terms of their contribution to inequality in South Africa. This was done by investigating 
how  a  change  in  one  of  the  components  in  income  would  contribute  to  a  change  in  the  Gini 
coefficient, using a decomposition that takes account of the share of a particular source of income in 
total group income, the Gini coefficient that the measures the extent of inequality in the distribution 
of that source of income, and the Gini correlation between the income from the particular source 
































1 (Leibrrandt, Woolard and Woolard, 1996). The study made use of data obtained in 
the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development conducted in 1993.  
 
Leibbrandt  et  al  (1996)  found  that  the  income  sources  in  which  a  change  exerted  the  biggest 
influence on the overall Gini coefficient were state transfers, remittances and wages. In the case of 
wages, an increase resulted in an increase in the Gini coefficient (reflecting an increase in inequality), 
and in the case of remittances and state transfers, an increase in these income sources resulted in a 
decrease in the Gini coefficient (reflecting a decrease in inequality). They also found that the income 
sources  that  tended  to  increase  inequality  were  highly  correlated  with  the  overall  rankings  of 
income, implying that an increase in these sectors predominantly benefited those at the top of the 
income distribution and therefore increased the Gini. 
 
Leibbrandt et al (1996) also considered the impact of a change in income components on welfare. 
They  explained  that  a  change  in  income  components  influenced  welfare  through  two  channels, 
namely  that  an  increase  in  mean  income  generally  increased  welfare,  and  that  the  income 
distribution was altered within the sample (indicated by the Gini coefficient) which either enhanced 
or diminished welfare, depending on the impact that an increase in a given income component had 
on inequality.  
 
The authors found that for African rural households in the former homeland areas of South Africa, 
state  welfare  transfers  increased  overall  welfare.  However,  for  the  poorest  amongst  these 
households (defined by the authors as households below the subsistence level
2), the distribution 
effect  discussed  above  was  negative,  indicating  that  state  welfare  transfers  “worsened”  the 
distribution of income (i.e. rendered it less equal). However, this negative distribution effect was 
outweighed  by  the  positive  income  effect,  rendering  the  overall  welfare  effect  positive.  For 
households above the household subsistence level, both the income and distribution effect were  
positive, indicating that state welfare transfers both increased the income received by households 
and contributed to a more equal distribution of income amongst these households. The combined 
positive effects mentioned above therefore resulted in an overall positive welfare effect on state 
welfare transfers (Leibbrandt et al, 1996). 
 
A later paper by Leibbrandt, Woolard and Woolard (2008) investigated the role played by social 
assistance grants in poverty reduction. They emphasised the centrality of social grants to poverty 
alleviation in South Africa, and pointed out that the system by which social grants were allocated and 
distributed  was  well-developed  for  a  middle  income  country.  Indeed,  by  2007,  social  assistance 
constituted 3.3% of GDP, compared to 1.9% of GDP in 2000/01, and by 2007 some 12 million people 
benefitted from social grants (Leibbrandt et al, 2008).  
 
An  analysis  by  Van  der  Berg,  Louw  and  du  Toit  (2007)  indicated  that  in  1995  and  2000,  the 
concentration coefficient for social grants took a value of  -0.434 and -0.431, respectively. These 
                                                       
1  , where Sk is the share of income source k in total income, Gk is the Gini coefficient that 
the measures the inequality of the distribution of income source k, and Rk is the Gini correlation between income 
from source k and total income. See Leibbrandt et al (1996) for a full discussion of the method.  
2 Subsistence levels are defined according to poverty lines that were published by the Institute for Planning 
Research. According to Deaton (1994), these poverty lines could be  converted to adult equivalence scales: E = 
(A + 0.5K)
0.9, where E = number of adult equivalents, A = number of adults, and K = number of children 
(Leibbrandt et al, 1996).  
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negative values indicated that the lower end of the income distribution received more than their 
share of social grants and was therefore an indication that social grants were well-targeted in South 
Africa.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature on social grants and their role in poverty alleviation and the 
reduction of inequality by making use of decomposition techniques that allow one to observe the 
contribution that each income source makes to poverty alleviation and to income inequality. The 
paper makes use of the 2005 Income and Expenditure Survey to conduct the analysis. 
 
Section 2 of the paper discusses the data used in the paper, while section 3 presents the poverty 
analysis. This section includes an explanation of the decomposition technique, as well as snapshot of 
poverty  (using  the  Foster-Greer-Thorbecke  index)  by  race  and  educational  attainment  of  the 
household head. The decomposition technique by which the contribution of various income sources 
to  poverty  alleviation  is  measured  is  explained  in  that  section,  and  the  results  from  this 
decomposition are discussed, with emphasis on the role of social grants. Section 4 of the paper 
presents the inequality analysis. The section includes an explanation of the General Entropy measure 
used  to  analyse  inequality,  followed  by  the  results  obtained  using  this  measure.  Results  are 
presented for inequality by race, gender, province, area and level of education. Inequality is then 
decomposed according to income source and the results presented, again with emphasis on the role 
of social grants in the reduction of inequality. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
This paper makes use of the 2005 Income and Expenditure Survey (IES). This survey was conducted 
by Statistics South Africa between September 2005 and August 2006. Although the IES is primarily 
aimed at identifying the bundle of goods to be used in constructing the Consumer Price Indexto, it 
does provide enough information to perform poverty and inequality analysis.  
 
The dataset contains information on income and consumption at a household level. Both income and 
consumption were converted to a per capita level. Consumption data were used in the analysis of 
poverty, and income was used in the analysis of inequality.  
 
The  2005/2006  IES  differs  somewhat  from  the  previous  two  IES’s  (1995  and  2000).  The  most 
prominent difference is the adoption of a diary method  which is a method by which household 
members  record  spending  on  a  daily  basis  over  a  period  of  a  month.  Although  this  method, 
combined with the sample design and the restructuring of the questions, is likely to deliver better 
results  than  the  previous  models,  it  does  have  the  disadvantage  of  making  this  survey  less 
comparable with its predecessors (Yu, 2008). This paper therefore refrains from making any cross 
survey comparisons and rather considers this survey in isolation. 
 
3. Poverty 
3.1 FGT Indices 
 
The normalized Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) index, proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke in 
1984, is used throughout the poverty analysis in this paper. The index’s monotonicity, flexibility and 
its  distributional  sensitivity  axioms  render  it  by  far  the  most  frequently  used  poverty  index.  In 
addition  to  the  aforementioned  characteristics,  the  FGT  measure  is  also  additively  sub-group  
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decomposable. This attribute will be applied in the next section in which poverty is decomposed 
across various subgroups of the South African population.  
 
The FGT measure is formally formulated as  
 
             
In this model, n is the population size, z is the poverty line, q is the number of people falling below 
this poverty line, yi is the income of the i
th person and α is the poverty parameter. By allowing the 
poverty parameter α to vary, it is possible to investigate different aspect of poverty. For the purpose 
of this paper, α takes the values of 0, 1 and 2.  
 
Setting Gi equal to the income shortfall (z - yi) of the i
th person (j = 1,2,…,q), the 3 FGT-indices (for 






Table 2 presents the results obtained from an application of the FGT measures just described at the 
three official poverty lines currently in use in South Africa
3 (R2532, R3864 and R7116) to the 2005 IES 
data.  
 









0.297  (0.005) 
 
0.471  (0.006) 
 
0.676  (0.005) 
 
 
0.103  (0.002) 
 
0.202  (0.003) 
 
0.380  (0.004) 
 
 
0.049  (0.001) 
 
0.110  (0.002) 
 
0.249  (0.003) 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
The results are represented graphically in figure 2. The figure illustrates the magnitude of the poverty 









                                                       
3 all prices are annual per capita income and at constant 2000 prices  
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FIGURE 2: FGT curves with α = 0, 1, 2. 
 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
3.2 Decomposition by Group 
In this subsection poverty is decomposed by race and educational attainment
4.  
 
a)  Race 
Table 3 presents the results obtained when poverty was decomposed according to race. 
TABLE 3: Decomposition of FGT measures by Race 
   Population 
Share 
Subgroup FGT  Poverty Shares 
     = 0    = 1    = 2    = 0    = 1    = 2 
African                        79%  0.552  0.239  0.068  93%  94%  95% 
 
(0.005)  (0.018)  (0.008)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Coloured                     9%  0.346  0.132  0.013  6%  6%  5% 
 
(0.003)  (0.023)  (0.011)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.005) 
Indian                       2%  0.078  0.022  0.000  0%  0%  0% 
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002) 
White                        9%  0.004  0.001  0.084  0%  0%  0% 
    (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.000) 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
A simple headcount ratio (FGT measure with α = 0) indicates that poverty differs substantially across 
different race groups. The table indicates that roughly 55% of African South Africans fall below the 
poverty line of R3 864 per capita per year (2000 prices), while roughly 35%, 8% and less than 1% of 
coloured, Indian and white South Africans respectively fell below that poverty line.  
 
A similar pattern is evident when the poverty gap (FGT with α=1) measure is used. Poverty was 
highest  amongst  African  South  Africans,  followed  by  coloured,  Indian  and  white  South  Africans 
respectively. The poverty gap ratios for African, coloured, Indian and white South Africans are 0.239, 
                                                       
4 The data was also decomposed by gender of household head, province and type of area. However,  it did not 


























Headcount Ratio Poverty Gap Poverty Gap Squared 
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0.132, 0.022 and 0.001, respectively. From the algebraic notation above, it can be shown that the 
poverty gap measure is an expansion of the simpler headcount ratio. All individuals who fall below 
the poverty line were allocated equal weight for the headcount measure. However, in the case of the 
poverty gap measure, each individual was allocated a weight equal to the magnitude of the shortfall 
( ). Consequently, the measure is more sensitive to the severity of poverty and therefore provides a 
more nuanced indication of the extent of poverty within race groups. 
 
The  third  index  is more  sensitive  to  the  severity of  poverty  than  the  poverty  gap  measure  just 
explained. By squaring the shortfall of each individual, individuals living in more severe poverty are 
weighted more heavily than those who lie closer to the poverty line. This index therefore places 
greater emphasis on the severity of poverty than the poverty gap measure. However, despite its 
algebraic appeal, this measure has the drawback of not being as interpretable as the previous two 
measures.  The  results  attained  for  this  measure  confirm  the  general  pattern  indicated  by  the 
headcount  ratio  and  the  poverty  gap  ratio:  that  poverty  is  most  severe  amongst  African  South 
Africans, followed in turn by coloured, Indian and white South Africans.  
 
The last 3 columns present a breakdown of total poverty among the four race groups. If poverty was 
equally distributed among the different race groups (so that the same proportion of people in each 
race group lived below the poverty line) we would have expected the poverty shares of each race 
group to be similar to the population shares of each race group. However, this was not the case. 
While Africans accounted for 79% of the South African population,they constitute 93% of the poor. 
Interestingly, the poverty share Africans increased to 94% if the poverty gap measure was used, and 
to  95%  if  poverty  gap  squared  measure  was  used.  Therefore,  as  the  poverty  measure  became 
increasingly sensitive to the severity of poverty, the poverty share of the African group became 
larger, indicating that Africans experience greater poverty relative to other race groups both in terms 
of incidence and severity.  Decomposing poverty by race group therefore illustrates that poverty was 
not only more common among Africans, but also more severe.  
 
In contrast, the poverty share of coloureds decreased as the sensitivity to the severity of poverty 
increased across the poverty measures. Neither the Indian nor the white population feature amongst 
South Africa’s poor. South African poverty is therefore largely an African and coloured phenomenon.  
 
b)  Educational Attainment (of household head) 
In a similar manner as above, poverty was decomposed by the level of education attained by the 
household head.  
 
TABLE 4:
 Decomposition of FGT measures by Educational Attainment of the Respondent 
   Population 
Share 
Subgroup FGT  Poverty Shares 
     = 0    = 1    = 2    = 0    = 1    = 2 
No Schooling                            0.188  0.763  0.370  0.157  30%  34%  41% 
 
(0.004)  (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Incomplete Primary                      0.221  0.647  0.284  0.084  30%  31%  32% 
 
(0.005)  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Incomplete Secondary                    0.371  0.430  0.165  0.025  34%  30%  25% 
 
(0.005)  (0.011)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.010) 
Matric                                  0.131  0.162  0.053  0.005  4%  3%  2% 
 
(0.004)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  
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Matric + Diploma                       0.052  0.032  0.011  0.000  0%  0%  0% 
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001 
Degree                                  0.033  0.003  0.000  0.000  0%  0%  0% 
   (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
The headcount ratio indicates that poverty was highest amongst the portion of the population where 
the household head had no schooling (approximately 76% of this group fall below the poverty line), 
becoming smaller for groups with progressively higher level of educational attainment (roughly 64% 
amongst  the  groups  with  incomplete  primary  schooling,  43%  for  the  groups  with  incomplete 
secondary schooling, 16% for those who have completed Matric, 3% of those with post-secondary 
schooling and less than 1% for graduates). A similar trend was observed when the poverty gap and 
poverty gap squared measures were used. 
 
Although it is unlikely that educational attainment alone is responsible for the large disparity in 
poverty levels between the different levels of education, it is interesting that (ignoring everything 
else)  an  increase  in  educational  attainment  of  the  household  head  decreased  a  household’s 
likelihood of being impoverished.  
 
The relative difference among the three poverty measures is most easily observed by comparing the 
poverty shares they produce. The poverty share of people living in households where the household 
head has no schooling increases for measures which use higher values of α (measures more sensitive 
to the severity of poverty), indicating that poverty is more severe in this group relative to the other 
groups. In the case of those with incomplete secondary schooling, the poverty share decreases for 
higher values of α in the FGT poverty measure, indicating that poverty is less severe for this group. 
The change in the poverty shares of these two groups therefore indicates that if the poverty line had 
been drawn at a lower level of income, the poverty shares of the groups would shift from those with 
incomplete secondary education to those with no schooling.  
 
3.3 Decomposition by Income Source 
This  subsection  investigates  the  relative  importance  of  each  different  income  source  in  poverty 
alleviation. The IES data allow for the disaggregation of income data into different income sources (or 
components). There were 23 components in total. These 23 components were aggregated into 8 
groups
5 considered important for this analysis. These are presented in table 5 below. 
 
TABLE 5: Income Components 
   Income 
Share    
Wages   71% 
Self-Employment   11% 
Rent & Royalties                     1% 
Social Grants   7% 
Allowances   3% 
Remittances  2% 
Other   5% 
Total  100% 
Source: IES2005 
                                                       
5 See appendix for complete explanation.  
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It may be assumed that, on average, the components that account for a larger portion of total 
income would play a larger role in pushing households closer to or over the poverty line. Although 
this assumption seems to make sense, the relationship is more complex. Simply taking the mean of 
each component as a crude measure of its relative impact on poverty alleviation is insufficient, since 
it fails to incorporate the different distributional effects among the components. In other words, the 
income  share  of  each  component  in  the  income  of  different  individuals  is  not  identical  for  all 
individuals, or income components are not distributed in the same way for different individuals.  
 
Duclos & Araar (2006) developed an algorithm that overcomes this problem. Rather than attempting 
to gauge the direct impact of each income component on poverty alleviation, they investigate the 
level of poverty that would have existed in the absence of this income source in overall income.  
 
They propose the testing of the marginal effect that each component has on poverty alleviation by 
comparing the FGT indices against what they would have been in the absence of a specific source of 
income. Although this method appears straightforward – simply calculating the drop in the poverty 
index that is due to the inclusion of an additional income source – it is not. The fact that the marginal 
effect of each component is largely dependent on the order in which different income components 
are included in the model is potentially problematic. Duclos and Araar (2006) circumvent this path-
dependency problem by making use of a Shapley-value. Instead of calculating the effect of a specific 
income component on a predetermined subset of income components, the Shapley-value calculates 
the average marginal effect of that component over all possible income subsets (including the empty 
subset). The results of applying this method are presented in table 5 below. 
 
TABLE 5: Decomposing Poverty by Income Source 
   Income 
Share 
Absolute Contribution to 
Poverty 
Relative Contribution to 
Poverty 
Elasticity of Poverty to a 
1% change in income 
components 
   α=0  α=1  α=2  α=0  α=1  α=2  α=0  α=1  α=2 
Wages   71%  -0.354  -0.414  -0.424  71%  55%  50%  1.00  0.77  0.70 
Self-Employed   11%  -0.041  -0.056  -0.062  8%  7%  7%  0.76  0.69  0.67 
Rent & Royalties  1%  -0.004  -0.006  -0.006  1%  1%  1%  0.63  0.58  0.58 
Social Grants   7%  -0.047  -0.176  -0.231  9%  23%  27%  1.42  3.51  4.09 
Allowances   3%  -0.017  -0.021  -0.023  3%  3%  3%  1.12  0.93  0.88 
Remittances  2%  -0.012  -0.037  -0.047  3%  5%  5%  1.41  2.74  3.09 
Other   5%  -0.021  -0.046  -0.060  4%  6%  7%  0.82  1.18  1.36 
Total  100% 
     
100%  100%  100%  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
Because income alleviates poverty, the marginal effect of each income component on each of the 
poverty measures is expected to be negative – a finding confirmed by the results presented in table 
5. On average, wages had the greatest absolute effect on poverty. At the mean, wages decreased the 
poverty headcount ratio by approximately 35%, by far the largest of any income component. Self-
employment income decreased the headcount poverty ratio by 4.1% and social grants by 4.7%. 
 
The relative contribution of each component to poverty is also reported in table 5. Although these 
proportions appear similar to the total income share, some noticeable dissimilarities exist. These 
dissimilarities highlight the different distributional compositions among the components, highlighting 




The relative contributions to the poverty headcount ratio and the relative income shares are identical 
for wages, both lying at 71%. Other income sources differ somewhat, but never by more than 3 
percentage points. However, in the case of social grants the share of the impact on the headcount 
ratio is higher than its income share.  
 
As the “sensitivity” of the poverty measure increases (i.e. as the poverty measure takes greater 
account of the severity of poverty), the gap between the income share of the component and the 
impact that it has on the headcount ratio becomes larger. The relative contribution that social grants 
make to poverty alleviation increases substantially as the sensitivity of the poverty measure to the 
severity of poverty increases. Using the poverty squared gap ratio, social grants account for 27% of 
the contribution, despite the fact that they constitute just 7% of overall income. By comparison, the 
relative role played by wages in decreasing the poverty gap squared ratio is 50%. Wages constitute 
71% of overall income. These two sources therefore differ by a factor of 10 in their contribution to 
overall income, only the contribution of wages to poverty alleviation (taking the severity of poverty 
into account) is twice as big as that of social grants.  
 
Therefore,  although  larger  income  components  still  have  a  larger  overall  influence  on  poverty 
alleviation,  smaller  components  are  often  more  effective  in  pushing  lower-earning  individuals 
towards or closer to the poverty relative to their share in overall income, particularly in the case of 
social grants. 
 
To illustrate this, an “elasticity” measure is constructed, which measures the relative size of each 
component  in  monetary  terms  to  the  relative  contribution  each  component  has  on  poverty 




These  elasticity-measures  (added  to  the  final  column  of  table  5)  differ  greatly  across  income 
components. Not surprisingly, the social-grants-component is the most efficiently targeted, with an 
elasticity measure of 1.42 for the headcount ratio, followed closely by remittances, with a value of 
1.41.  This  value  increases  dramatically  for  poverty  measures  which  control  for  the  severity  of 
poverty, illustrating the value of social grants in improving the situation of the most impoverished. 
For the poverty gap measure social-grants has an elasticity-value of 3.51 - much larger than that for 
wages (0.77). For the poverty gap squared measure, the gap between the contribution of social 
grants and wages to poverty alleviation increases to a factor of 6. This implies that in terms of impact 
on poverty alleviation, each R1 government spends on poverty alleviation through social grants is 6 
times more effective than the average R1 earned through the conventional labor-market in terms of 
poverty, which we know to be heavily skewed and exclusive.  
 
Despite the fact that this a-theoretical decomposition method used above provides a fair way of 
comparing a range of income components, it is unclear as to whether this method is ideal for the 
analysis of the effect of any one specific income source, particularly if we have some knowledge of 
the ordering of these income components. Indeed, this seems to be the case with social grants. 
Social grants are means-tested, rendering it is reasonable to assume that they are only allocated 
after individual is unsuccessful in attaining a sufficient income without receiving grants. This section  
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assumes that this is true and that social grants are therefore the last possible source of income 
obtained by individuals. This simplifying assumption makes it possible to investigate the effect of 
social grants by comparing only total income to what total income would have been in the absence 
of social grants. The assumption that social grants to now result in any behavioral change was made, 
although it is acknowledged that this is not entirely accurate.  
 
Figures 3, 4 and 5 present the FGT curves before and after controlling for social grants. The dotted 
line below the x-axis indicates the impact of social grants on poverty alleviation. 
 
FIGURE 3: Poverty Headcount Ratio (α=0) for different poverty levels  
 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
TABLE 6: Effect of Social Grants on Poverty (α = 0) 
   Poverty Line 
   R2532  R3864  R7116 
Before Social Grants  0.455  (0.006)  0.550  (0.006)  0.676  (0.005) 
After Social Grants  0.316  (0.005)  0.473  (0.006)  0.653  (0.005) 
Difference  -0.138  (0.004)  -0.077  (0.003)  -0.024  (0.002) 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
Figure 3 indicates that the impact of social grants diminishes as the poverty line is drawn at higher 
levels of income. This is confirmed by table 6, which presents the data on the impact of social grants 
at the three experimental poverty lines employed by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA). It may be seen 
that at a poverty line of R2 532 per person per year (2000 prices), the poverty headcount ratio 
decreases  from  roughly  45%  to  approximately  32%,  indicating  that  social  grants  decreased  the 
incidence of poverty by roughly 13 percentage points.  At a poverty line of R3 864 per person per 
year (2000 prices), social grants decreased the incidence of poverty by slightly less than 8 percentage 
points, and at a poverty line of R7 116 per person per year (2000 prices), social grants decreased the 
poverty headcount ratio by slightly more than 2 percentage points. Social grants therefore appear to 
































Before Grants After Grants Difference 
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at  lower  poverty  lines  –  an  indication  that  social  grants  were  most  effective  for  individuals 
experiencing relatively severe poverty. 
 
FIGURE 4: Poverty Gap (α=1) Measure for different poverty levels 
 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
TABLE 7: Effect of Social Grants on Poverty (α = 1) 
   Poverty Line 
   2532  3864  7116 
Before Social Grants  0.284  (0.004)  0.360  (0.004)  0.479  (0.004) 
After Social Grants  0.121  (0.002)  0.217  (0.003)  0.382  (0.004) 
Difference  -0.163  (0.003)  -0.143  (0.002)  -0.097  (0.001) 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
The impact of social grants on poverty measured using the poverty gap ratio indicates that the 
severity of poverty was somewhat reduced after social grants. Importantly, the reduction in this 
poverty measure was greatest at the R2 532 per person per year poverty line, followed in turn by the 
R3864 per person per year poverty line and the R7116 per person per year line – a further indication 
of the effectiveness of social grants in targeting the poorest in society. 
 
 The difference between pre- and post-social grant poverty was confirmed when the poverty gap 
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FIGURE 5: Squared Poverty Gap Measure (α=2) for different poverty levels 
 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
TABLE 8: Effect of Social Grants on Poverty (α = 2) 
   Poverty Line 
   2532  3864  7116 
Before Social Grants  0.208  (0.004)  0.279  (0.004)  0.386  (0.004) 
After Social Grants  0.063  (0.002)  0.126  (0.002)  0.260  (0.003) 
Difference  -0.152  (0.003)  -0.153  (0.002)  -0.126  (0.002) 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
Figure 5 and Table 8 illustrate that the impact of social grants on poverty became less dependent on 
the location of the poverty line as the measure employed became more sensitive to the severity of 
poverty. This gap between the before and after social grant indices was more persistent. 
 
The distinction between the percentage point and percentage change is worth noting at this point 
(and may further illustrate the effectiveness with which social grants target the most severe poverty). 
Referring to table 6, at a poverty line of R2 532 per person per year, social grants decreased the 
poverty headcount ratio by roughly 14 percentage points. However, this 14 percentage point drop in 
poverty affectted roughly 46% of the population (those who would have been in poverty without 
social grants). Therefore, by decreasing the headcount ratio from 46% to 32%, social grants pushed 
31% of the poor (at the relevant poverty line) over the poverty line. If the poverty line is drawn at 
R3 864 per person per year, social grants pushed roughly 13% (7% of 55% who would have been in 
poverty) of the poor out of poverty, and if the poverty line is drawn at R7 116 per person per year, 
roughly  3%  of  the  poor  were  pushed  over  the  poverty  line  by  social  grants.  Using  changes  in 
percentage points to investigate the impact of social grants on poverty illustrates their true ability to 
alleviate poverty. Indeed, percentage changes alone clearly underestimate the impact of social grants 












































4.1 GE Indices 
This section makes use of the Generalised Entropy index to measure and decompose inequality. This 
measure is formulated as  
 
6 
In this model, n is the population, u is the mean income, and poverty α is the sensitivity parameter. 
As  with  the  FGT  measure,  varying  the  value  of  α  parameter  changes  the  GE  measurement’s 
sensitivity to specific parts of the distribution. For α close to zero, prevalence is given to those at the 
lower end of the income distribution. For α=1 (Theil-index), the index is equally sensitive across the 
entire distribution. For α> 1, prevalence is given to those at top end of the distribution (Shorrocks, 
1984). 
 





4.2 Decomposition by Group 
Although the Generalized Entropy (GE) measures are less widely used than the Gini coefficient, they 
provide more flexible options. As with the FGT index, the GE indices have the desirable attribute of 
being  additively  sub-group  decomposable.  Furthermore,  the  GE  measures  also  allow  for  the 
comparison of the relative extent of inequality within groups as well as for the comparison of the 
magnitude of these combined effects with the extent of inequality that exists between the different 




                                                       
6 The literature on the General Entropy measure generally uses an α symbol instead of the σ used in the 
formula in this paper. The symbol σ has been used in order to avoid possible confusion with the α used in the 
previous section in the FGT poverty measures.  
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Estimate  Relative Contribution 
              
 






Between Race  0.358  (0.008)  0.484  (0.006)  0.823  (0.005)  0.402     0.483     0.311    
Within Race     0.532  (0.010)  0.518  (0.025)  1.825  (0.185)  0.598     0.517     0.689    
African  79%  0.545  (0.011)  0.648  (0.017)  1.474  (0.081)  0.486  (0.012)  0.270  (0.014)  0.122  (0.011) 
Coloured  9%  0.595  (0.027)  0.626  (0.029)  1.087  (0.084)  0.059  (0.003)  0.049  (0.004)  0.028  (0.004) 
Indian  2%  0.504  (0.062)  0.543  (0.086)  1.077  (0.326)  0.014  (0.002)  0.024  (0.005)  0.033  (0.011) 







  Between Gender  0.072  (0.000)  0.066  (0.001)  0.063  (0.001)  0.081     0.066     0.024    
Within Gender  0.818  (0.012)  0.935  (0.024)  2.585  (0.184)  0.919     0.934     0.976    
Male  56%  0.897  (0.019)  0.933  (0.028)  2.183  (0.178)  0.570  (0.012)  0.690  (0.015)  0.800  (0.026) 










Between Province   0.108  (0.001)  0.110  (0.001)  0.117  (0.001)  0.122     0.110     0.044    
Within Province  0.782  (0.024)  0.891  (0.024)  2.531  (0.184)  0.878     0.890     0.956    
Western Cape  10%  0.973  (0.006)  0.960  (0.017)  2.086  (0.311)  0.109  (0.006)  0.179  (0.017)  0.275  (0.042) 
Eastern Cape  14%  0.732  (0.006)  0.898  (0.008)  2.571  (0.532)  0.119  (0.006)  0.086  (0.008)  0.062  (0.013) 
Northern Cape  2%  0.702  (0.001)  0.822  (0.001)  1.924  (0.151)  0.019  (0.001)  0.013  (0.001)  0.008  (0.001) 
Free State  6%  0.784  (0.003)  0.869  (0.006)  1.953  (0.233)  0.055  (0.003)  0.058  (0.006)  0.053  (0.008) 
KwaZulu-Natal  21%  0.805  (0.009)  0.978  (0.012)  2.669  (0.360)  0.190  (0.009)  0.135  (0.012)  0.092  (0.015) 
North West  7%  0.778  (0.004)  0.866  (0.006)  2.557  (0.661)  0.061  (0.004)  0.051  (0.006)  0.048  (0.011) 
Gauteng  20%  0.788  (0.007)  0.822  (0.017)  1.755  (0.215)  0.179  (0.007)  0.269  (0.017)  0.352  (0.039) 
Mpumalanga  7%  0.824  (0.006)  1.020  (0.009)  2.835  (0.387)  0.069  (0.006)  0.055  (0.009)  0.043  (0.010) 






Between Area     0.171  (0.001)  0.142  (0.002)  0.126  (0.002)  0.192     0.142     0.047    
Within Area     0.719  (0.012)  0.859  (0.024)  2.523  (0.184)  0.808     0.858     0.953    
Urban  59%  0.836  (0.017)  0.870  (0.025)  1.920  (0.147)  0.554  (0.007)  0.727  (0.008)  0.860  (0.021) 











Between Education   0.417  (0.006)  0.462  (0.006)  0.679  (0.010)  0.473     0.465     0.260    
Within Education   0.473  (0.010)  0.540  (0.024)  1.969  (0.184)  0.527     0.535     0.740    
No Schooling  19%  0.341  (0.025)  0.443  (0.052)  1.123  (0.273)  0.072  (0.006)  0.022  (0.003)  0.006  (0.001) 
Incomplete Pri  22%  0.357  (0.015)  0.421  (0.024)  0.834  (0.100)  0.089  (0.004)  0.033  (0.003)  0.008  (0.001) 
Incomplete Sec  37%  0.538  (0.019)  0.633  (0.035)  1.542  (0.255)  0.224  (0.009)  0.159  (0.013)  0.099  (0.017) 
Matric  13%  0.674  (0.026)  0.675  (0.039)  1.374  (0.188)  0.099  (0.005)  0.170  (0.013)  0.252  (0.033) 
Matric&Diploma  5%  0.504  (0.035)  0.477  (0.044)  0.776  (0.155)  0.029  (0.002)  0.085  (0.010)  0.180  (0.034) 
Degree  3%  0.373  (0.033)  0.356  (0.036)  0.496  (0.076)  0.014  (0.001)  0.066  (0.008)  0.195  (0.031) 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
Interesting  to  note  is  the  relative  contribution  of  various  groups  to  inequality  in  South  Africa. 
Decomposing inequality into its within- and between-group components in terms of race illustrates 
that  when  σ=0,  inequality  was  driven  primarily  by within-group  inequality, with  this  component 
increasing for higher values of σ (i.e. as the measure becomes more sensitive to people at the higher 
end of the income distribution). This indicates that within-group inequality was increasing as a result 
of people at the top end of the income distribution earning increasingly higher wages relative to 
those at the lower end – most likely a reflection of a rising African middle-class. The same pattern 
was observed across all dimensions along which inequality was decomposed, again reiterating the 
fact that inequality in South Africa was driven by higher earnings of those at the top of the income 
distribution.  
 
The  increase  in  the  within-group  component  of  inequality  along  the  lines  of  education  was 
substantial, especially as the value of σ changed from 1 to 2 – an increase from 53.5% to 74.0%. This  
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indicates the role of education in increasing earnings and therefore the role that education may play 
in perpetuating inequality in society (with only those at the top end of the income distribution being 
able  to  invest  in  the  type  of  education  that  would  result  in  increased  earnings,  therefore 
perpetuating the correlation between income and education). However, in the case of race, gender, 
provinces,  area  and  education,  the  within-group  component  of  inequality  contributed  more  to 
overall inequality than the between-group component. 
 
4.3 Decomposition by Source 
 
Inequality may also be decomposed across income components, allowing for the investigation of the 
contribution of various income sources to inequality. Unfortunately, the correlations between the 
components rendered only one of the GE-indices useful for the decomposition of inequality into 
income  components:  half  the  square  of  the  coefficient  of  variation  (σ=2).  The  results  for  this 
decomposition using a method proposed by Shorrocks (1982) are presented in table 10 below. 
 








Wages  69%  3.278  (0.505)  69%  (0.058) 
Self-Employed  10%  0.747  (0.159)  16%  (0.038) 
Rent & Royalties  1%  0.124  (0.054)  3%  (0.011) 
Social Grants  10%  -0.024  (0.006)  -1%  (0.001) 
Allowances  3%  0.051  (0.010)  1%  (0.002) 
Remittances  2%  0.005  (0.003)  0%  (0.001) 
Other  5%  -0.279  (0.279)  12%  (0.051) 
Total  100%  3.903 
 
100% 
  Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
Table 10 presents the proportion of total income constituted by various income sources. It is clear 
that wages constitute the largest percentage of income, even though wages are received by only a 
small proportion of the population (given the prominence of unemployment in the South Africa 
labour  market).  The  relative  contribution  of  these  various  income  sources  (reported  in  the  last 
column of the table) indicates the role that each of these components of income play in driving 
inequality. It is obvious that wages play by far the most prominent role, again emphasizing the 
prominence of higher income earners in driving inequality. 
 
For the sake of this analysis it is important to note that social grants played a largely negligible role in 
remedying inequality. The negative sign indicates that social grants served to diminish inequality, but 
by a largely inconsequential amount. Therefore, despite the fact that some 10% of overall income 
may be attributed to social grants, they did little to decrease income inequality.  
 
Again, this reiterates the fact that using the GE(2) measure,  inequality was driven predominantly by 
high income earners and so while social grants may be effective in alleviating the level of poverty 
experienced by people at the bottom of the income distribution, they were unlikely to be effective in 
easing the level of inequality in society as a whole.  
 
The  Lorenz  curve  plots  the  cumulative  percentage  of  the  population  receiving  the  cumulative 
percentage of overall income by income source. The population was ranked from poorest to richest 
in terms of per capita income along the x-axis. A perfectly equal distribution of income would have   
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therefore been represented by the 45
◦ line. An unequally distributed income source would have 
indicated that a large proportion of the overall population received a small percentage of income 
from a particular income source and so a large proportion of the Lorenz curve would fall below the 
45
  ◦ line. In other words, an unequal distribution would have been a distribution in which a large 
share of the population only received a small share of the income component in question. On the 
other hand, an income components that diminished inequality would be an income source with a 
large magnitude, received by a large proportion of the population and would lie above the 45
◦ line. In 
other words, a small proportion of the population would receive a large component of the inequality-
diminishing income component. 
 
FIGURE 6: Lorenz Curve measuring the relative inequality within every income source
 
Source: Own calculations using IES2005 
 
From the Lorenz curves in figure 6, it may be seen that social grants were the only source of income 
that served to diminish inequality since a large proportion of the population at lower levels of income 
received  them.    However,  as  discussed  above,  their  impact  was  negligible  given  the  fact  that 
inequality was driven by high income earners (i.e. by people who did not receive social grants) and so 
the impact of social grants was unlikely to play any significant role in diminishing inequality.  
5. Conclusion 
The size and coverage of social grants in South Africa is indeed impressive. As mentioned before, 
social  grants  in  South  Africa  compare  favourably  with  developed  countries  and  are  considered 
impressive in comparison to those of other developing countries. Ironically, the apartheid roots of 
the social grants system have ensured that the system put in place is decidedly comprehensive and is 
effectively the extension of a system designed to keep a certain segment  of the population (i.e. poor 
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In 2009, South Africa’s economic landscape is characterized by widespread poverty and inequality. 
Indeed, the extent of these phenomena renders the economic reality for a broad spectrum of society 
rather bleak. Social grants may be seen as a tool with which government may remedy the extent of 
economic hardship for its citizens.  
This paper has shown that social grants were very effective in alleviating poverty. Furthermore, as 
the emphasis placed on the most impoverished in society increased, so too did the measure of the 
effectiveness of social grants in reducing poverty, indicating that South African social grants were 
well-targeted.  It  is  important  to  mention  that  the  impact  that  social  grants  have  on  household 
formation (i.e. people attaching themselves to households in which social grants are received as a 
source of income, particularly in the case of pensioners (Case and Deaton, 1996)) imply that social 
grants  played  an  even  greater  role  in  the  alleviation  of  poverty  than  was  measured  using  the 
methods  applied  in  this  paper.  Indeed,  to  the  extent  that  social  grants  reach  further  than  the 
individuals  to  whom  they  are  allocated  (through,  for  example,  their  impact  on  households 
formation), their role in poverty alleviation becomes increasingly important. 
However, in terms of providing a remedy for inequality, social grants proved less useful. This is 
because inequality was driven primarily by high and rising incomes of people at the top end of the 
income distribution. It must be remembered that inequality measures place differential emphasis on 
the different portions of the income distribution and so measures that place the greatest emphasis 
on individuals at the top end of the income distribution produced a picture of more severe inequality 
in South Africa than those measures placing emphasis on individuals at the lower end of the income 
distribution.  Social  grants  were  targeted  at  the  poorest  members  of  the  population  and  were 
implemented with the intention of pushing those living in poverty over the poverty line. It  was 
therefore impossible for social grants to remedy inequality to the same extent that they remedied 
poverty, since relative to income of the population’s top earners (i.e. the main drivers of inequality), 
the value of social grants was tiny. Therefore, although social grants were impressively effective in 
alleviating poverty, the same cannot be said for their role in terms of diminishing inequality. 
Social grants were effective in pushing poor people closer to the poverty line, therefore providing 
some kind of relief from the misery characterizing poverty. However, in order to achieve any long 
term remedy to the situation of perpetual poverty and inequality, those living in poverty require a 
means  to  access  higher  levels  of  income  on  a  sustainable  basis.  Social  grants  were  unable  to 
guarantee sustainable access to higher levels of income.   
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